Commons versus Public Good

In English, the terms 'republic' and 'commonwealth' have tended to be understood as synonyms. 'Republic' comes originally from the Latin 'respublica'. Since 'res' means 'thing' or 'affair', the respublica is effectively the public thing or public good. A 'republic' then, in its simplest terms, is a government that operates in the interests of the public rather than in the private interests of the rulers. 'Commonwealth' is an English version of the same idea, referring to what is in the common interest. While the regime established following the execution of Charles I in early 1649 was officially called the 'Commonwealth and Free State', it was frequently described as a republic. Yet while these terms have been used as synonyms, they do have different connotations deriving from their historic use. This was brought home to me through work I have been doing on the project 'Wastes and Strays: The Past, Present and Future of Urban Commons'. Commons are a long-standing feature of the landscape of the British Isles, but in the mid-nineteenth century an interesting shift occurred, whereby these spaces - and especially those located in urban areas - began to be characterised as public assets rather than as the locus of common rights.

Nomansland Common Hertfordshire. Image by Rachel Hammersley.

The origins of commons date back to medieval times. In general they were manorial wastes over which specific common rights were granted to particular groups of local people. In most cases these rights were agricultural and related to subsistence. They included: the common of pasture, the right to graze animals such as sheep, cows, or horses on the common; the common of estovers, which was the right to gather wood or other vegetation such as furze to use as fuel, for repairs to houses or equipment, or for animal bedding; and the common of turbary which was the right to take peat or turf for fuel. As Guy Standing has argued, what these rights offered was a kind of safety net to help the local community (and especially its poor) through hard times (Guy Standing, Plunder of the Commons: A Manifesto for Sharing Public Wealth. Harmondsworth: Pelican, 2019, pp. 8, 38). 

Norwich as viewed from St James Hollow on Household Heath. Wastes and Strays, 18 June 2020. Image by Sarah Collins.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the ownership and management of many commons situated in urban areas was transferred from the local lord of the manor to the city authorities. For example, Durdham Down was bought by Bristol City Council in 1861 and, after a protracted legal battle, the City Corporation of Norwich officially took legal ownership of Mousehold Heath from the Dean and Chapter of Norwich Cathedral (the original landowner) in 1883.

These changes in ownership and management encouraged the perception that urban commons were public assets. In certain respects this was a positive shift. In general it meant that the land had to be open and accessible to the public at large rather than just to commoners or local residents. It also reinforced the growing sense that the primary purpose of these spaces was recreation rather than agricultural activity, which was generally fitting, given their location.

Charles Bradlaugh by an unknown photographer, 1860s. National Portrait Gallery NPG Ax18357. Reproduced under a creative commons licence.

Yet, while there were gains, something was lost in this transformation. Gone was the idea of commons as offering subsistence or as providing a safety net for the poorest during difficult times. Yet many people still lived precarious lives. The land campaigner Charles Bradlaugh cited research on the poor conditions in which many workers were living in the 1870s. He noted that in one Bedfordshire parish 'one-third of the entire population were receiving pauper relief, and it seemed altogether to puzzle the relieving officer to account for the manner in which one-half of the remainder lived' (Charles Bradlaugh, The Land, The People, and The Coming Struggle. London, 1874, p. 9). Even today with the increasing reliance on food banks and the emergence of zero-hours contracts, it would seem that the need for such a safety net remains, and yet the state benefits that had been established in the first half of the twentieth century to serve as this have been greatly weakened since the 1980s. Secondly, there was a shift away from a sense of shared ownership. While commons were not usually owned by the commoners, the fact that they enjoyed rights of access and rights to various produce of the land, created at least a semblance of ownership. And ownership, in turn, helps to give people a sense of identification with the space as well as encouraging them to cherish, protect, and take care of it. Such sentiments are less likely to arise if these green spaces are seen as a public asset - a resource provided for the public by the authorities but remaining firmly under council control. Finally, commons invoke a sense of working together for a common purpose and, therefore, of reciprocity. To gain what they needed from the common, commoners had to exercise their rights by labouring on the common whether by grazing their animals there or by gathering wood for fuel. Once the commons are regarded as a public asset or a service provided to the public, the sense of users having duties or responsibilities over the space is diminished.

Cows grazing on the Town Moor in Newcastle. Wastes and Strays. 10 May 2021. Image by Rachel Hammersley.

What might be the benefits of shifting back from a language of public assets and resources to one of common goods? Could it be used to curb the increasingly pernicious tendency to appeal to 'efficiency' in order to cut public services to the bone? Could it be a means to establish the primacy of community ahead of the private interests and benefits of those in privileged positions? Could it even lead to the introduction of a fair system of taxation, which is viewed not as an unwelcome burden on the individual, but as an opportunity to build a rich and sustainable society in which all members are provided with the means to flourish?

I am getting carried away, but as an intellectual historian I do believe that the language that we use to frame our understanding has the power to bring concrete political change. There might well be benefits to be gained from reclaiming the idea of the 'common wealth' and encouraging active engagement and participation on the part of citizens.

Experiencing Political Texts 1: Endings and Beginnings

While it is January that is named after a god who looks both forwards and backwards, for those of us working in educational establishments in the UK, the early autumn is also a good time for simultaneous reflection on the past and forward planning. In this spirit, this month's blogpost will look back to a project I have recently completed and offer a preview of a new project I am planning.

On 25 September Republicanism: An Introduction was published by Polity Press. As we approach the final month of the Presidential election campaign in a country that has long claimed to exemplify republican ideals, the United States, the questions: what is republican government? and what is required in order for it to function effectively? are more pertinent than ever. As I explain in my book, the older definition of a republic was a system in which government operated in the interests of the common or public good. The violent clashes that have taken place recently between Black Lives Matter protestors and Trump supporters throw doubt on any claim that there is a single, shared understanding of the common good in the US today. Of course, in the now more commonplace definition of republican government as the antonym of monarchy, it may seem that the US is unquestionably a republic, but can this judgement survive in the face of rule by a billionaire who wields far greater powers than any sitting monarch in the world and who gifts members of his own family positions of high office?

I explore these definitions more fully in a blogpost I have written for Polity Press. The book takes a chronological approach, starting with the ancient ideas and practices that formed the basis of later republican theories, before examining how those theories developed and were put into action in the context of the Renaissance, early modern Europe and the Enlightenment, and the English, American and French Revolutions. It then considers the ways in which republican ideas have been adopted by new groups, and adapted to new ends in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Overall, the book argues that republicanism is a dynamic, living language, the survival of which is predicated on its adaptability, and which retains the potential to offer answers to the pressing political issues of the twenty-first century.

Last month's blogpost on this site, which focused on the material culture of republican rule, was the last in a series about myths of republican government, exploring current political issues on which the history of republican thought offers useful insights. Yet that post simultaneously pointed towards my next project.

The cover of Thomas Hollis’s edition of James Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana, Houghton Library, Harvard University: HOU GEN *EC65.H2381 656c (B) Lobby IV.2.18. I am grateful to staff at the Houghton for giving me permission to include this here and to Dr Mark Somos for his assistance. Note the owl on the front cover which indicates the wisdom of the text.

In early modern Europe, improvements in the mechanics of printing, rising literacy levels, and a series of political crises, combined to provide both the means and the market for an outpouring of political texts. Historians of political thought have paid great attention to the content or substance of those texts; analysing the language used, the arguments made, the debates to which they contributed, and the historical contexts out of which they emerged. Far less attention has been paid to the form of these texts, by which I mean both the genre(s) in which they were written and their physical or material aspects. There was no uniform genre for early modern political works, they could take the form of philosophical treatises, dialogues, travel literature, utopias, even poetry or drama. Moreover, many of them playfully blended fact and fiction. Similarly, the material dimensions of political texts - including their size, paper quality, frontispieces, typeface and binding - varied enormously and often provide clues as to their intended audiences and relate closely to the arguments they were designed to convey. Moreover understanding the ways in which those texts circulated as physical objects is also crucial to making sense of both the intentions of their authors and the ways in which they were received and used by readers.

Paying attention to these aspects of early modern political texts is crucial if we are to understand fully the functions of those texts. Often they were designed not merely to inform their readers and convince them of the validity of the arguments presented, but to prompt their readers' engagement with those arguments and even incite them to action. This was particularly important for republican texts, which were often explicitly concerned with provoking a shift from otium (contemplation) to negotium (action).

The elaborate frontispiece to John Toland’s edition of James Harrington’s The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington (London, 1737), Copy author’s own.

It was my work on James Harrington that first drew these neglected aspects of early modern political texts to my attention. Scholars have long found it difficult to explain why Harrington veiled his greatest work, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in a rather laboured utopian form. The common argument - that it was a way of avoiding censorship - is inadequate given that a work advocating commonwealth government was in line with the views of the authorities in 1656 and that he actually removed the utopian veil from the works he produced in 1659-60 - a much more dangerous moment to voice republican arguments with the return of the monarchy looking increasingly likely. Rather, as I argued in my book, Harrington used the utopian format to indicate that what he was offering in that work was an alternative vision of England's future - one that departed in crucial ways from the actual path that had started to be taken after the dissolution of the Rump Parliament in 1653. Moreover, the fictional elements were designed to give the impression to his readers that the events he was describing were actually taking place, thereby providing them with the opportunity to imagine his ideal commonwealth and effectively to try it on for size - albeit in their imaginations rather than in reality. This fitted with Harrington's underlying philosophy that people are more likely to be convinced of the viability of new systems and institutions if they experience them rather than just read about them. This strategy also extended beyond the genre of the work to its physical form, with the constitutional orders printed in black type to make them look to seventeenth-century readers like official proclamations issued by the Government.

As my initial research has revealed, Harrington was by no means unique in using this sort of strategy. Examining the form of other early modern political texts therefore has the potential to enrich and expand our understanding of those texts, the arguments their authors were advocating, and the impact they were designed to elicit in their readers. Over the next few months I will offer a number of case studies of early modern political writers whose attention to form was central to their mission and purpose.

Exploring these methods and considering how effective they were in achieving their ends has implications for our reading of those texts today and for the ways in which they are presented to modern audiences. It raises questions, for example, about the relative advantages of accessing the text in its original form, in a modern paper edition, or in a digital version. It also prompts us to think about whether there may be ways of reflecting the material elements of a text (its size, paper quality etc.) in digital form. Finally, all of this raises questions about how political arguments are articulated today. Does the format in which we receive political information or opinion affect how we understand or approach it? How far does the layout of a text determine the extent to which we engage with or interact with it? Do we respond differently to political ideas that come to us in hard copy (in a newspaper or printed book) as compared with those that we access digitally? And how do different digital formats affect our understanding? In both these contexts, paying attention to form as well as to substance may yield some interesting observations.

Myths Concerning Republicanism 5: Republics are only suited to small states

Anonymous portrait of Montesquieu after Jacques-Antoine Dassier (c.1728). Reproduced from Wikimedia Commons.

It was a commonplace in the eighteenth century that republics are suited only to small states. This idea was memorably articulated by two of the most significant political theorists of the eighteenth century the Frenchman the Baron de Montesquieu and the Genevan Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

In The Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu declared:

It is in the nature of a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise, it can scarcely continue to exist. In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and consequently little moderation in spirits: the depositories are too large to put in the hands of a citizen; interests become particularised; at first a man feels he can be happy, great, and glorious without his homeland; and soon, that he can be great only on the ruins of his homeland.

In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions; it depends upon accidents. In a small one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive there and consequently less protected (Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. A. Cohler, B. Miller and H. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 124).

Statue of Jean-Jacques Rousseau near the Pantheon in Paris. Image by Rachel Hammersley

Similarly, in The Social Contract Rousseau argued that a true republic was only possible in a small state, where the whole population could gather together on a regular basis: 'The Sovereign, having no other force than the legislative power, acts only by means of the laws, and the laws being nothing but the authentic acts of the general will, the Sovereign can only act when the people is assembled.' (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 100).

This myth relied on the fact that most republics both past and present had been small; operating in city-states rather than nation-states. Moreover, it was precisely the expansion of the Roman republic that was viewed by figures like Montesquieu as having caused its political and moral corruption, ultimately resulting in the shift to imperial rule (Montesquieu, Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Declension of the Roman Empire from The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu, translated from the French. London, 1777, pp. 61-66).

While there were a few exceptions in the form of the Dutch, Swiss, and English republics, all of which had emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these were generally seen as proving rather than challenging the rule. The Dutch and Swiss republics were confederacies or leagues bringing together several city-states rather than being single large republics. The English 'commonwealth and free state' of the mid-seventeenth century was a genuine exception, but its reputation as a short-lived, precarious, and contentious regime did more to hinder than to advance the cause of large republics.

It goes without saying that the idea that republics are only suited to small states does not remain a potent myth today. Most governments calling themselves republican now rule over states that are large in both population size and area. The republic that did more than any other to undermine the myth was the American one established following the Declaration of Independence of 1776.

Howard Chandler Christy, Signing of the Constitution of the United States (1940). Reproduced from Wikimedia Commons.

Yet the extent to which the United States of America really was - or is now - a republic in the traditional sense of the term is open to challenge. One such challenge has been articulated in forceful terms by the historian Eric Nelson. In The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding (Cambridge - Massachusetts, 2014) Nelson argues that America's founding fathers owed as much to royalist arguments of the mid-seventeenth century as they did to republican ones. Far from opposing royal tyranny in 1776, many American revolutionaries were reacting against the actions of Parliament and what they saw as its usurpation of royal prerogative in relation to the colonies. Moreover, in doing so they drew on the arguments of those who had opposed Parliament's attack on the prerogative of Charles I in the mid-seventeenth century. When it came to designing new constitutions, these men argued for a strong, single executive holding sweeping prerogative powers. As a result the American president was assigned far greater power than any British monarch had wielded for over a century. The legacy of those decisions remain today in the considerable powers still afforded to the US president and his ability to take crucial decisions for good or ill - the consequences of which are currently on display.

A different challenge to America's status as a republic was raised by the political philosopher Michael J. Sandel. In Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge - Massachusetts, 1996) Sandel argued that while the original constitution was grounded in republican ideas, they had gradually been eroded. By the late twentieth century there was considerable discontent with public life, and in particular fears around the loss of self-government and the erosion of a sense of community or public spirit. Despite America's status as a republic, the dominant political philosophy, Sandel argued, was no longer republicanism but a version of liberalism which placed centre stage the idea that the government should remain neutral in regard to the moral and religious views of its citizens. These issues have been brought into sharp relief by the current crisis. One feature of this liberalism is the absence of a public health service in the US. In the current crisis this means that those without adequate private healthcare provision may be left to die and it has made a co-ordinated public response to the crisis difficult. This lack of co-ordination has been identified as one reason why cases have advanced more quickly in the US than in other countries - such as Germany - which have a stronger health and social security system.

Of course the shortcomings of the current US system do not prove the impossibility of large-state republics. Republican government operates today in a variety of large states - including Germany. Yet eighteenth-century concerns - and the US example - should serve to remind us of the need to think carefully about what is necessary in order for a republic to function effectively in a large state, and to warn us that such states must be closely monitored for evidence of decline. The establishment of representative government and a strong executive undoubtedly provided useful means of making large-state republics possible, but such states can only function effectively where there are robust processes in place to hold both representatives and executive officers (including the president) to account. In addition, careful attention must be paid to the nature of, and the means to achieve, the public good. After all, government in the service of the public interest was one of the early definitions of republicanism.

James Harrington: An Intellectual Biography

On 3 October my intellectual biography of James Harrington will be published by Oxford University Press. While I have already said much about that book, its origins and its arguments, in my blogposts, I could not let this date pass without revisiting some of the aims of that book and how working on it has affected my research interests and priorities.

Something I've learned from my research into Harrington is the multivalence and malleability of key political terms not least 'republic' and 'democracy'. Harrington has conventionally been characterised as a leading republican thinker - particularly since the publication of John Pocock's groundbreaking research on him in the 1970s. Yet Harrington's republicanism was complex and he failed to adhere either to the conventional constitutional definition of a republic as a government without a single person at its head, or to the necessity of a genuinely virtuous citizenry. He accepted the possibility, even the potential benefits, of having a single figurehead at the apex of a republican system of government, as long as that individual was not treated as sovereign and was carefully constrained in the exercise of executive power. Indeed he even suggested that the former king Charles I or the protectors Oliver or Richard Cromwell could have performed this role if they had behaved differently. He also argued bitterly with other republican thinkers in the late 1650s, eschewing the conventional republican understanding of civic virtue and instead adopting a Hobbesian view of human nature and acknowledging the role of self-interest in public affairs.

A Proposition in order to the Proposing of a Commonwealth or Democracy, one of several Harringtonian works that explicitly advocates democracy. Taken from James Harrington, The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington… (London, 1737). Author’s own edition.

In some ways, given his firm commitment to the primacy of popular power, Harrington might be more appropriately described as a 'democrat' than a 'republican'. It is certainly significant that while he generally avoided the term 'republic' (preferring instead the more ambiguous 'commonwealth'), he did describe the system that he advocated as a 'democracy'. Yet, Harrington's understanding of this term is equally idiosyncratic. He certainly saw the people as performing an important role within a commonwealth, making them the final arbiters as to whether a piece of legislation should be enacted or not, and insisting on measures to make officeholders accountable to those they represent. But, at the same time, he argued that the popular will should be tempered by the wisdom of the few, assigning them the right to frame legislative proposals; and he imposed other restrictions on the democratic participation of citizens. Ultimately, as Colin Davis has argued, Harrington's aim was to protect the popular will and the pursuit of the public interest from the danger of demagoguery and party diverting it in the direction of particular interests (J. C. Davis, 'James Harrington and the Rule of King People', in Democratic Moments: Reading Democratic Texts, ed. Xavier Márquez, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, pp. 65-72).

A second lesson I have drawn from this project is the importance of taking an interdisciplinary approach to the history of political thought, while at the same time acknowledging the difficulties inherent in doing so. Harrington has tended to be understood as a narrowly political thinker - while Pocock paid attention to his economic, historical, scientific, and religious ideas, these aspects of his thinking have not received much attention from subsequent scholars. Yet a full understanding of Harrington's position requires an appreciation of all aspects of his thought, unhindered by the imposition of disciplinary divisions that only emerged long after his death. Harrington applied his understanding of democracy not just to politics but also to religion. Ultimately, not only could the political, religious, military, and judicial organisation of Oceana be mapped directly on to its economic foundations, but the whole system was grounded in Harrington's philosophical understanding of the nature of human beings and their relationship to God, the state, and the universe.

The Manner and Use of the Ballot in which Harrington makes use of a visual image as a means of bringing his ideas alive for his reader. Taken from Harrington, The Oceana and Other Works.

What this implies is that a full understanding of Harrington's ideas requires the skills of the historian, economist, and the theologian. Also important are those of the literary theorist. Harrington sought to convey his ideas not just via the content of his works, but also through the genres in which he wrote, and even placed emphasis on the material form of his texts. The form of Oceana blended royalist and parliamentarian genres (illustrated by the use of different typefaces), just as his arguments were designed to reconcile these groups to his proposed constitutional framework. Moreover, Oceana, and his other works, were written in the light of his belief that people learn better via experience than by instruction. His adoption of a quasi-utopian format, his thick sensory-rich descriptive passages, and his occasional use of visual devices, were all designed to bring his model alive for his readers to allow them to experience it in their imaginations.

Finally, as earlier blogposts have made clear, researching Harrington over the last three years has made me particularly attentive to the continued currency of his ideas today, and of the utility of understanding past political events and debates as we propose future solutions.

Republics v Monarchies

The Scottish National Party recently brought the question of the Monarchy back onto the political agenda by voting at their 2017 party conference in favour of cutting public funding for the Royal Family. Delegates supported overwhelmingly a motion calling for the repeal of the Sovereign Grant Act of 2011. While the vote will not bring immediate political change, since Westminster retains control of the Sovereign Grant, the vote has drawn attention once again to the alleged republicanism at the heart of the SNP and the idea that an independent Scotland might choose to replace the Queen as head of state. Such suggestions always produce strong views on both sides, usually labelled 'republican' and 'monarchist'.

On the surface, at least, the distinction between republics and monarchies is a crucial feature of our modern political landscape. Yet the history of these two constitutional forms is far more complex than this simple dichotomy would suggest. Indeed, according to one historical definition, Britain is and has long been a republic, whereas on the basis of another neither France nor the United States of America is worthy of that term. Monarchists and republicans alike might, therefore, benefit from a deeper understanding of the history of these political concepts.

Bust of Cicero. I am grateful to Katie East for providing the image.

The concept of republican government, in both theory and practice, dates back at least to ancient Rome. It was explored in a number of Roman texts, not least those of Marcus Tullius Cicero who was both a politician and a political thinker. In his De re publica Cicero did not define a republic or commonwealth in opposition to kingship, but instead argued 'that a commonwealth (that is the concern of the people) then truly exists when its affairs are conducted well and justly, whether by a single king, or by a few aristocrats, or by the people as a whole'. (Cicero, On the Commonwealth, ed. James. E. G. Zetzel Cambridge, 1999,  p. 59). The key distinction here, then, is between rule that serves the public interest and that which serves private interests. So, on Cicero's account, a monarchy, if properly organised and directed towards the public good, could be a kind of republic. That same idea was still being voiced as late as the mid-eighteenth century, when the Genevan-born political theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in his Social Contract:

I therefore call Republic any State ruled by laws, whatever be the form of administration: for then the public interest alone governs, and the public thing counts for something. Every legitimate government is republican.

The accompanying footnote might appear self-contradictory, if Cicero's position is not borne in mind:

Statue of Jean-Jacques Rousseau outside the Pantheon in Paris. Image by Rachel Hammersley.

By this word I understand not only an Aristocracy or a Democracy, but in general any government guided by the general will, which is the law. To be legitimate, the Government must be not confused with the Sovereign, but be its minister. Then monarchy itself is a republic. (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, ed. Victor Gourevitch, Cambridge, 1997, p. 67)

   But while the Ciceronian understanding of a republic survived well into the eighteenth century, from the late fifteenth century onwards a second understanding was developing. This saw monarchy not as one form of republican government, but as its direct opposite. Several historians have recently traced the development of this tradition of republican thought, emphasising its debt to the writings of Italian Renaissance thinkers as well as to a tradition of Jewish Biblical scholarship that offered a distinctive take on the Israelites' plea to God in I Samuel 8 that they be given a king like other nations.

By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were certainly those who saw republican government as requiring the destruction of monarchy. The English Civil War of the 1640s prompted some parliamentarians to attack not simply Charles I, or even just tyrants, but all kings. Marchamont Nedham was one of several figures who challenged the very distinction between kings and tyrants: 'Had they [the English] but once tasted the sweets of peace and liberty both together, they would soon be of the opinion of Herodotus and Demosthenes that there is no difference between king and tyrant and become as zealous as the ancient Romans were in defence of their freedom.' (Marchamont Nedham, The Case of the Commonwealth of England Stated, ed. Philip A. Knachel, Charlottesville, 1969, pp. 127-8). This view had practical import too. The 'Act Abolishing the Office of King', which was passed on 17 March 1649, declared the office of king to be 'unnecessary, burdensome, and dangerous to the liberty, safety, and public interest of the people' and the ensuing 'Act Declaring England to be a Commonwealth and Free State', which was passed in May 1649, insisted that this government was to be 'without any King or House of Lords'.

John Milton, by unknown artist, National Portrait Gallery, NPG4222. Reproduced under a creative commons license.

Yet even this does not present the full complexity of the concept, since those who agreed that republicanism was, by definition, anti-monarchical, could nevertheless disagree over precisely what institutional form should replace the office of king. Most significant was the distinction between those who insisted merely on the absence of a monarch, and those who outlawed any form of single-person rule. Thus a third definition of republic required that the government was not headed by a single figure, but by a group or council. As John Milton asserted in The Readie and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth: 'I doubt not but all ingenuous and knowing men will easily agree with me, that a free Commonwealth without single person or house of lords, is by far the best government, if it can be had.' (John Milton, The Readie and Easy Way, in Selected Prose, ed. C. A. Parties, Harmondsworth, p. 338). Milton's formulation ruled out both monarchy (as in the reign of Charles I) and a Protectorate (as under Oliver Cromwell).

Moreover, the English revolutionaries had attempted to institute such a form a decade earlier. When Charles I was executed on 30 January 1649 he was replaced not by another single person, but rather by the Rump Parliament, which ruled together with its Council of State, until April 1653. Yet as its short life - and the rise of Oliver Cromwell - would suggest, experiments involving a purely conciliar government have often proved unsuccessful in practice. The experiments in France in the 1790s with the Committee of Public Safety, and later the Directory, further confirmed this conclusion.

Evidently, it is the second definition of a republic outlined above that is most common today, so that a republican wishes to abolish the Monarchy. According to the first definition, that of Cicero, modern Britain could, despite having a Queen as head of state, be counted as a republic so long as government decisions were made in the public interest. Indeed, there were those in the eighteenth century who made precisely that argument. In 1700, the controversial political thinker and activist John Toland declared that 'if a Commonwealth be a Government of Laws enacted for the Common good of all the People' and if they had some means to consent to those laws 'Then it is undeniably manifest that the English Government is already a Commonwealth, the most free and best constituted in all the world.' (John Toland, The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington, London, 1737, p. vii-viii). According to the third definition, by contrast, which requires that a single person must not be given considerable power, neither France nor the United States of America (both of which have a President), would be deemed worthy of that label.

Viewed historically, 'monarchy', is no easier to define than 'republic'. We can see this if we consider precisely what features make a monarch. Hereditary rule might be thought of as one key element, but this does not hold in the case of the early-modern Polish monarchy, which was elective. We might, then, say that a monarch generally holds his or her position for life. This would work for the Polish system, but it was also true of the Doge of Venice during the same period, and yet most people would argue that the Doge was the head of a republic rather than being a monarch.  Instead of thinking about the nature of the position, then, we might consider the extent of the power wielded. But this seems no more satisfactory as a basis for distinguishing monarchies from republics, since from the late eighteenth century to the present the President of the United States of America has tended to wield far greater powers than the English monarch. While part of the problem here is that the modern British Monarchy is in some ways a misnomer, since our Queen is a hereditary figurehead rather than a power-wielding head of government, even in the late eighteenth century George Washington already enjoyed greater powers in certain respects than George III. (For an interesting exploration of the royal tendencies in the American system see Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2014).

John Lilburne, England's New Chains Discovered, London, 1649. http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/leveller-tracts-6. 18.10.17. Taken from the Online Library of Liberty [http://oll.liberty.org] hosted by Liberty Fund, Inc.

This is not to say that important differences between what are conventionally labelled as monarchies and republics do not exist. The expenditure of public money on the Royal Family and the upkeep of royal palaces has always been one of the stronger arguments in the British republican arsenal (though of course presidential systems and legislative assemblies also incur costs). But we must also be careful not to assume that all our political problems can be solved by establishing a republic. It did not take long even for those seventeenth-century English revolutionaries who had called for an end to the monarchy to realise that many problems remained in its wake. Perhaps the best illustration of this is the fact that, less than a month after the regicide, the Leveller leader John Lilburne published a pamphlet which he entitled England's New Chains Discovered.